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Abstract. In this work, we modify the Affine Wealth Model of wealth distributions to exam-
ine the effects of nonconstant redistribution on the very wealthy. Previous studies of this model,
restricted to flat redistribution schemes, have demonstrated the presence of a phase transition to a
partially wealth-condensed state, or “partial oligarchy”, at the critical value of an order parameter.
These studies have also indicated the presence of an exponential tail in wealth distribution precisely
at criticality. Away from criticality, the tail was observed to be Gaussian. In this work, we generalize
the flat redistribution within the Affine Wealth Model to allow for an essentially arbitrary redistri-
bution policy. We show that the exponential tail observed near criticality in prior work is in fact a
special case of a much broader class of critical, slower-than-Gaussian decays that depend sensitively
on the corresponding asymptotic behavior of the progressive redistribution model used. We thereby
demonstrate that the functional form of the tail of the wealth distribution of a near-critical society is
not universal in nature, but rather is entirely determined by the specifics of public policy decisions.
This is significant because most major economies today are observed to be near-critical.
Key words. Distribution Theory, Econophysics, Kinetic Theory, Pareto Distribution, Statistical
Mechanics, Wealth Distributions.
AMS subject classifications. 35Q84, 35Q91, 91B80
1. Introduction.
1.1. Motivation. The search for a universal form for the distribution of wealth
dates back over a century to the pioneering work of Vilfredo Pareto, who first posited
that wealth distribution tails are decaying power laws [16, 17]. While this problem
may seem like a simple matter of data-fitting, modern work on the subject has become
vastly more complicated for at least two key reasons.
The first problem is that it is no longer sufficient to fit wealth distribution tails
to particular functional forms, without some microscopic model to explain the origin
of those forms. Studies over the last two decades have focused on the construction
of simple models of binary transactions that can account for the form of empirical
wealth distributions [1, 10, 14]. Relating those to agent density functions and other
macroscopic observable quantities then requires advanced techniques of probability
theory and statistical physics [5].
The second problem has to do with the paucity of wealth data. Only about a
sixth of the world’s countries collect reliable wealth data on their household surveys.
Moreover, studies of the asymptotic behavior of the tail of the wealth distribution are
necessarily focused on obfuscated data due to a small minority of households reporting
their wealth. For example, to protect anonymity, the US Survey of Consumer Finance
does not list the wealth of any household earning more than $100 million and many
other countries have followed suit [15].
Thus, the problem of determining how the tail of a distribution of wealth behaves
is still very much an open question. In this work, we demonstrate that attempts
to isolate the tail of the wealth distribution for study are, by nature, problematic.
This is, in part, because the transport equations governing wealth distribution are
integrodifferential – and hence nonlocal – in nature [5, 14]. What is happening on the
tail both determines and is determined by what is happening in bulk. Moreover, the
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assumption that there exists a universal form for the tail of wealth distributions is valid
only when those distributions are far from a certain critical point marking the onset
of wealth condensation. Closer to that critical point, the form of the tail is subject
to the minutiae of national redistribution policies, rather than to any universal law
of wealth distribution. Because many of the largest economies in the world today lie
near this critical point, it follows that one should not expect their wealth distribution
tails to have a universal form.
There are lasting implications of this work related to how wealth distributions are
viewed as economic objects. This work implies that one cannot compare the distribu-
tions of any two societies without considering the policy decisions of months, years,
and decades prior. This work emphasizes the extreme importance of redistribution in
determining the form of the tail of the wealth distribution. Our work shows that even
minor policy changes can be extremely influential in large-wealth asymptotics, and
indeed that a better approach to modeling wealth distributions would be to consider
redistribution policy as the key driving entity determining the form of the wealth
distribution tail.
1.2. Review of literature. The model that we use in this work is an example
of an asset-exchange model, first introduced in the 1980s [1], and first analyzed using
methods of statistical physics in the 1990s [13, 12]. These models posit simple binary,
stochastic transactions between randomly chosen pairs of agents. Our model is best
understood as the result of a historical sequence of such models leading up to it.
The Yard Sale Model – proposed by Chakraborti in 2002 [10] – is an asset exchange
model in which the transferred wealth is proportional to the wealth of the poorer agent
in a pairwise transaction. The small, positive proportionality captures the plausible
fact that agents tend not to stake a large fraction of their total wealth in a single
transaction, which models a kind of risk-aversion. Remarkably, even when the winner
of a transaction is chosen with even odds in this model, wealth accumulates in the
possession of a single agent, whom we call the oligarch. This phenomenon of a finite
fraction of societal wealth belonging to a vanishingly small fraction of agents was
called wealth condensation by Bouchaud and Mezard in 2000 [8], and subsequently
studied further by Burda et al. [9]. Chakraborti’s result may seem counter-intuitive
because one would expect that a system relying on a fair coin to determine the winning
agent should not confer an advantage to any one economic agent. From an economic
perspective, this result is very Keynesian in that it suggests that market forces are
unstable at their core and require some level of exogenous redistribution to provide
stability.
In 2014, a Boltzmann equation was derived for the general Yard Sale Model [4].
It was also shown that this equation reduces to a nonlinear integrodifferential Fokker-
Planck equation, similar to the sort used in plasma kinetic theory, where the weak-
transaction limit is analogous to the weak-collision limit [19]. Later in 2014, this
same universal Fokker-Planck equation was shown to be derivable by means of a
stochastic process [3]. The Yard Sale Model was then extended to include a flat
redistribution scheme, wherein every economic agent pays an amount proportional
to his or her wealth and receives a benefit proportional to the average wealth in the
economy 1. This work showed that the oligarchical time-asymptotic state described
by Chakraborti is completely mitigated under even as simple a redistribution scheme
1Equivalently stated, each economic agent is moved a certain fraction of the way toward the
mean. Those below the mean move upward, while those above the mean move downward. The
process pays for itself, as global wealth is conserved.
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as a positive flat one.
The concept of Wealth-Attained Advantage (WAA), which replaces the fair coin
used in determining the winner and loser of an interaction with one that favors the
richer economic agent, was also introduced to the Yard Sale Model in 2017 [5]. This
extension is perhaps best motivated by James Baldwin’s memorable aphorism, “Any-
one who has ever struggled with poverty knows how extremely expensive it is to be
poor” [2]. Manifestations of Baldwin’s precept are pervasive, and one example is
the substantial difference in mortgage interest rates seen by rich and poor economic
agents. The Yard Sale Model with both WAA and flat redistribution is called the
Extended Yard Sale Model (EYSM) [5]. The work that introduced the EYSM also
introduced the concept of wealth condensation criticality : This is a state where the
redistribution parameter is equal to the WAA parameter. It was shown that the
oligarchical share of wealth depends sensitively on these two parameters, as will be
discussed in more detail later in this work. For now, suffice it to say that supercritical
values of the WAA parameter – that is, values above the critical value – will result
in a partial oligarchy; subcritical values of this parameter will result in no partial
oligarchy at all.
Both the Yard Sale Model and its extensions assume that agent density has sup-
port contained in the positive real numbers so that negative wealth is not possi-
ble by construction. In 2016, however, 10.9 % of households in the United States
were estimated to have negative wealth (their liabilities outweighed their assets) [15].
Therefore, the addition of negative wealth was seen as an important generalization
that needed to be made to the Extended Yard Sale Model. In 2019, the Affine Wealth
Model (AWM) was introduced [14]. The AWM assumes that there is some fixed, max-
imum amount of debt in an economy, and modifies the Extended Yard Sale Model
accordingly. When the AWM was fit to the Survey of Consumer Finances data on
wealth distributions with the Forbes 400 between 1989 and 2016, it was highly suc-
cessful at modeling the United States wealth distribution with an average point-wise
error of less than or equal to 0.16% for each fitting. In this work, we will extend the
flat redistribution that was assumed in this work, in order to examine its effects on
the phenomenology of the AWM at large wealth.
1.3. New results. The primary goal of this study is to consider the implications
of a more general, possibly non-constant, redistribution scheme to the distribution
of large wealth in the context of the above-mentioned models. We will begin by
examining the properties of the asymptotic solution to the steady-state Extended Yard
Sale Model’s Fokker-Planck equation under general redistribution and will discuss the
ramifications of its behavior at large wealth. We will then generalize the asymptotic
solution obtained from the Extended Yard Sale Model to include the possibility of
negative wealth, and thereby obtain results for the AWM.
As mentioned above, prior work has demonstrated that when asymptotically fi-
nite redistribution functions tend toward the WAA parameter, the oligarchical share
of wealth exhibits a phase transition [11] In this work we show that exactly how the
redistribution function approaches the WAA parameter in the limit of large wealth
determines the nature of the tail of the distribution of wealth in a near-critical society.
In particular, small alterations in redistribution policy can radically change the na-
ture of a distribution of wealth near criticality. In statistical physics, it is well known
that the asymptotic behavior of distributions is extremely sensitive to model param-
eters near criticality, and this work provides the equivalent observation for wealth
distribution models.
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Additionally, by solving the “inverse problem” of fitting data obtained from the
European Central Bank (ECB) to the AWM with constant redistribution parameters,
we demonstrate that all of the fourteen ECB countries that we analyzed are near-
critical. This implies that the tails of these countries’ wealth distributions are prone
to an extreme sensitivity to the policy decisions made in that society. This strongly
suggests that minute details of those countries’ redistribution policies are more impor-
tant to the shape of their wealth distributions than any universal economic principles.
1.4. Structure of this work. In Section 2, we review notation and derive the
nonlinear, integrodifferential Fokker-Planck equation for the EYSM with general re-
distribution. We then solve for the functional form of the tail of the wealth distribution
of the EYSM with general redistribution.
In Section 3, we generalize the asymptotic form for the tail of the solution of the
EYSM with general redistribution to include the possibility of negative wealth. We
then show that the phase transition that occurs in the EYSM with general redistribu-
tion also occurs in the AWM with general redistribution, and we review the derivation
of the oligarchical fraction of wealth.
In Section 4, we investigate the inverse problem associated with the models in
Section 3. We assume knowledge of the large-wealth, steady-state agent density func-
tion and solve for the redistribution function corresponding to that distribution of
wealth. We then examine possible functional forms for the decay of the tail of the
wealth distribution in the case of progressive redistribution. We observe a sensitive
dependence of the distribution of large wealth to the form of the redistribution func-
tion in near-critical economies. Finally, we fit the flat-redistribution AWM to ECB
wealth data for the fourteen countries that it serves, and demonstrate that all are
near-critical.
2. General redistribution in the Extended Yard Sale Model.
2.1. Notation and the steady-state Fokker-Planck equation. In this sec-
tion, we will begin by describing the Fokker-Planck equation [18] for the Extended
Yard Sale Model (EYSM) [5]. A Fokker-Planck equation is a partial differential equa-
tion that describes time evolution of a distribution influenced by drag and random
forces. In any asset exchange model, N economic agents engage in binary transactions
in which wealth is transferred. We can describe a wealth distribution in the context
of the EYSM through the use of the agent density function, P (w, t). In this section,
we will assume all agents have nonnegative wealth, which requires P (w, t) to have
support [0,∞). We will relax this assumption in Section 3.
We define P (w, t) to be a distribution such that
∫ b
a
dw P (w, t) describes the
number of economic agents with wealth between a and b at time t. It follows that∫ b
a
dw P (w, t)w describes the total wealth of those agents. Hence, the total population
and total wealth can be derived from the agent density function:
N :=
∫ ∞
0
dw P (w, t)
W :=
∫ ∞
0
dw P (w, t)w.
In general, population and wealth are conserved by variations of the Yard Sale
Model [5], which is why we do not attach time-dependence to N and W . We let
µ = W/N be the average wealth.
THE NON-UNIVERSALITY OF WEALTH DISTRIBUTION TAILS 5
We now will introduce the Pareto-Lorenz potentials, which will be of great use
in our later derivations [17]. Vilfredo Pareto and Max Lorenz were among the first
academics to try to characterize the distributional nature of wealth, and their con-
tributions are still in use in the study of wealth distributions. Mathematically, the
Pareto-Lorenz potentials are the zeroth through second incomplete moments of the
agent density function:
A(w, t) : =
1
N
∫ ∞
w
dx P (x, t)(2.1)
L(w, t) : =
1
W
∫ w
0
dx P (x, t)x(2.2)
B(w, t) : =
1
N
∫ w
0
dx P (x, t)
x2
2
.(2.3)
The function A(w, t) is the fraction of agents with wealth greater than or equal to
w at time t. Similarly, L(w, t) is the fraction of wealth held by agents whose wealth
is less than or equal to w at time t. There is no easy economic interpretation for
B(w, t), but it will nonetheless be useful in our derivations. Because this section
assumes nonnegative wealth, A(w, t) uniformly decreases as wealth increases, while
L(w, t) and B(w, t) uniformly increase with w. So long as the support of P (w, t) is a
subset of the nonnegative real numbers, the range of A(w, t) and L(w, t) is [0, 1].
Following earlier work [5], we cite the Fokker-Planck equation for the EYSM,
which assumes a constant redistribution scheme:
∂P
∂t
=− ∂
∂w
[
χ(µ− w)P
]
+
∂
∂w
{
ζ
[
2
µ
(
B − w
2
2
A
)
+ (1− 2L)w
]
P
}
+
∂2
∂w2
[(
B +
w2
2
A
)
P
]
.
(2.4)
where A, L, and B are the Pareto-Lorenz potentials defined in Equations (2.1)-
(2.3) [5]. For ease of notation, we drop functional dependence, but at this point,
P , A, L, and B are to be understood as functions of both wealth and time. The
parameter χ indicates the level of redistribution in an economy while ζ indicates the
level of WAA in an economy. Thus, a higher χ would indicate a greater amount of
redistribution benefiting lower-wealth agents. On the other hand, a higher ζ would
indicate a larger advantage held by wealthy agents in the modeled economy.
Equation (2.4) assumes that the rate paid for redistribution is constant across
the wealth spectrum. However, wealth redistribution is typically non-constant and
usually progressive. To generalize redistribution in the EYSM, we now introduce the
concept of a redistribution function χ(w), which is at the moment arbitrary apart from
the assumption that χ(w)P (w, t)w is globally integrable for all t. The redistribution
function χ(w) will be a function of wealth that returns the rate of redistribution
paid by an agent with wealth w. It is easy to see that the total wealth collected for
redistribution at time t is given by
T (t) :=
∫ ∞
0
dx P (x, t)χ(x)x.(2.5)
At time t, we assume that an economic agent receives a benefit proportional to the
average redistribution collected at time t: T (t)N . Note that at any given time, all
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redistribution is distributed among agents so that wealth is conserved. That is, re-
distribution moves from agents to agents, and not from agents to a government body.
Thus, redistribution is considered distinct from taxation in our model. We leave the
problem of including non-redistributive taxation in asset exchange models to others
interested in modeling the interplay between government and economic agents.
Given this construction of χ(w), we can easily incorporate a generalization of
wealth redistribution into Equation (2.4):
∂P
∂t
=− ∂
∂w
[(
T (t)
N
− χ(w)w
)
P
]
+
∂
∂w
{
ζ
[
2
µ
(
B − w
2
2
A
)
+ (1− 2L)w
]
P
}
+
∂2
∂w2
[(
B +
w2
2
A
)
P
]
.
(2.6)
Conservation of population and total wealth in the nonredistributive terms was shown
in prior work [5] while conservation of the redistributive term can be verified using
Equation (2.5). We set the time derivative of Equation (2.6) to zero and integrate
once with respect to wealth to obtain the following first-order nonlinear non-local
ordinary differential equation describing the steady-state wealth distribution:
d
dw
[(
B +
w2
2
A
)
P
]
=
{
T
N
− χ(w)w − ζ
[
2
µ
(
B − w
2
2
A
)
+ (1− 2L)w
]}
P.(2.7)
Note that in Equation (2.7), we have dropped dependence on time and have used total
derivatives with respect to wealth. We will henceforth follow this precedent because
we will only be dealing with steady-state wealth distributions for the duration of this
work.
2.2. Large wealth analysis of steady-state Fokker-Planck equation.
2.2.1. Assumptions on agent density at large wealth. We now establish
notation that will be used extensively throughout this work. We will use the notation
g(w) h(w) to mean
lim
w→∞
g(w)
h(w)
= 0.(2.8)
An equivalent notation often used for this functional relationship is g(w) = o[h(w)].
Furthermore, we will say that g(w) ≈ h(w) if
lim
w→∞
g(w)
h(w)
= 1.(2.9)
We now will provide a set of assumptions that will enable us to approximate the
large-wealth behavior of agent density. Using the notation defined in Equation (2.8),
we will need the a priori assumption that the redistribution function χ(w) satisfies
dχ
dw
 w[χ(w) + αw + β]2
for any real constants α and β. Note that this condition is very general and functional
forms for χ(w) ranging from arbitrary polynomials to the exponential of arbitrary
polynomials will satisfy it.
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We now make some a posteriori assumptions on the distribution of large wealth.
Assume that
P (w) ≈ Ce−f(w) + cWΞ(w),(2.10)
where f(w) is a twice-differentiable, asymptotically monotone function defined on
(M,∞)—for some M > 0—satisfying the following conditions:
f ′(w) > 0(2.11)
f ′(w)
√
f ′′(w)(2.12)
ef(w)  w
2
[f ′(w)]2
,(2.13)
We assume that C is a positive constant of integration [5]. We will use only redistri-
bution functions χ(w) for which Equations (2.11)-(2.13). These constraints are very
lax and are satisfied, inter alia, by all functions of the form
f(w) ≈ wp logq(w),
where either p > 0 and q ∈ R or p = 0 and q > 1. This is shown in Appendix A.
The function Ξ(w) given in Equation (2.10) is a generalized distribution that
was introduced in prior work to represent the oligarchical fraction of wealth in an
economy [11, 6]. There is a broad literature on the behavior of Ξ(w), which we leave
to the reader to investigate further. Briefly, however, Ξ(w) satisfies∫ ∞
0
dw Ξ(w) = 0∫ ∞
0
dw Ξ(w)w = 1∫ b
a
dw Ξ(w)w = 0
for any a, b ∈ R. The constant c is a number between 0 and 1 representing the fraction
of wealth in the possession of an oligarch. This constant will be investigated further
in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.2. Agent density function at large wealth. In this section, we will de-
rive an approximate form for f(w) based on the assumptions given in Equations
(2.11)-(2.13). Prior work leads us to posit that it is the behavior of redistribution at
large wealth which enables or inhibits oligarchy [7, 5, 11]. By better understanding
the functional form of agent density for the wealthiest agents in the distribution, we
hope to better understand which redistribution policies are sufficient to preclude oli-
garchy. The following lemma is necessary to make the approximations which serve
as the foundation for this work. It can easily be proven through Equation (2.9), an
application of L’Hopital’s Rule, and the consequences of our assumptions, which are
provided in Appendix B.
Lemma 2.1. Under the assumptions listed in Equations (2.11)-(2.13), when
wealth is sufficiently large and m ≥ 0,∫ ∞
w
dx xm exp[−f(w)] ≈ w
m
f ′(w)
exp[−f(w)].
8 S. L. POLK AND B. M. BOGHOSIAN
Note that we can define L(w) and B(w) in terms of integrals that are considered
by Lemma 2.1. In particular, at equilibrium,
L(w) = L∞ − 1
W
∫ ∞
w
dx P (x)x
B(w) = B∞ − 1
N
∫ ∞
w
dx P (x)
x2
2
,
where L∞ and B∞ are the complete first and second moments of P (w) with respect
to w. Prior work has shown these to be finite numbers [5]. Intuitively, one would
expect L∞ to be 1 because W is defined to be the first complete moment of P with
respect to wealth. In fact, this reasoning holds even for the asymptotic behavior
of A(w), and it can be proven that A(w) tends toward zero as w → ∞. However,
numerical simulations and analytic studies have shown that this orderly convergence
does not hold for L(w) [6, 5, 11]. It has been shown that, for asymptotically constant
redistribution functions χ(w) ≈ χ∞ > 0,
L∞ : = lim
w→∞L(w) =
{
1 if ζ ≤ χ∞
χ∞
ζ if ζ > χ∞
(2.14)
[5, 11]. This phenomenon was shown to be due to a second-order phase transition
observed at criticality—a state defined by χ∞ = ζ—that is due to Ξ(w) [6, 11].
Prior work observed that if ζ > χ∞ – a state called supercritical – there is a partial
oligarch with fraction of total wealth c = 1 − χ∞ζ . Conversely, if ζ < χ∞—a state
called subcritical—there is no partial oligarchy whatsoever (c = 0). This relationship
between redistribution and WAA explains the duality exhibited in L∞ in Equation
(2.14). In both subcritical and supercritical distributions, the distribution of large
wealth is observed to be Gaussian. However, if χ∞ = ζ – a state called critical – the
oligarchical fraction of wealth drops to zero and the distribution of large wealth is
observed to be exponential [5, 11].
Reducing the steady-state Fokker-Planck equation requires significant algebra,
which is provided in Appendix C. The final result is that Equation (2.7) reduces to
f(w) ≈ 1
B∞
∫ w
dx χ(x)x+
ζ(1− 2L∞)
2B∞
w2 +
2ζB∞ − TN µ
B∞µ
w.(2.15)
The lower limit of integration in the redistributive term of Equation (2.15) is omitted
because it is a subdominant constant of integration. Note that for any given redistri-
bution function χ(w) and WAA parameter ζ satisfying our assumptions, we can use
Equation (2.15) to find the distribution of large wealth. We emphasize that this form
of f(w) is both an extension and corroboration of prior research on the EYSM at
large wealth [5]. In that work, the steady-state Fokker-Planck equation’s asymptotic
solution was found to be
f(w) ≈ |χ− ζ|
2B∞
w2 +
2ζB∞ − χµ2
B∞µ
w,(2.16)
which is derivable from Equations (2.14) and (2.15) if redistribution is assumed to be
constant [5]. Importantly, Equation (2.15) implies that so long as the wealth limit of
χ(w) is greater than ζ, oligarchy is impossible and L∞ = 1.
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3. General Redistribution in the Affine Wealth Model. In Section 2, we
solved for the large-wealth distribution of agent density under the assumption that
wealth is nonnegative. However, economic agents with negative wealth are widely
observed in real-world data. For example, in 2016, 10.9 % of the population of the
United States was estimated to have negative wealth [15]. In this section, we extend
our earlier generalization of redistribution in the EYSM to a generalization of redis-
tribution in the Affine Wealth Model (AWM). We will use the work of Section 2 as
the basis for this extension.
The AWM is a recently-introduced Asset Exchange Model that allows for non-
negative wealth. The AWM has been highly successful at modeling empirical wealth
data [14]. It is based on the EYSM, but allows the support of the agent density func-
tion to be contained in [−∆,∞), where ∆ ≥ 0 is the fixed maximal value of debt in
an economy. Thus, economic agents can forfeit more wealth than their net worth, but
only up to a set limit. The AWM was constructed so that transacting agents have the
same economic relationship to each other as if their wealth was shifted upward by ∆.
In particular, before a given transaction, economic agents add ∆ to the wealth. They
will therefore have positive wealth for the duration of the transaction and the results
of the EYSM and Section 2 will apply. At the end of the transaction, ∆ is subtracted
from both agents’ wealth. Thus, the AWM shifts the agent density function of the
EYSM on the wealth axis by a factor of ∆.
In this section, we will follow prior notation and bar quantities that are used
within the context of the EYSM. We will let the unbarred quantities refer to their
AWM equivalents. For example, P¯ (w) will denote the steady-state agent density
function explored in Section 2 and P (w) will denote the steady-state “shifted wealth”
agent density function of the AWM. We assume that P (w) has support contained
within [−∆,∞). The following algebraic manipulation can be easily observed, linking
P (w) and P¯ (w).
P (w) := P¯ (w + ∆).(3.1)
If we make the same a posteriori assumptions on agent density that we made in
Section 2.2.1—given in Equations (2.11)-(2.13)—we arrive at an approximate form
for f¯(w) ≈ − log[P¯ (w)], given by Equation (2.15). By Equations (2.15) and (3.1), the
distribution of large wealth is given by
f(w) ≈− log[P (w)]− log(C)
≈f¯(w + ∆)− log(C)
≈ 1
B¯∞
∫ w+∆
dx χ(x)x+
ζ(1− 2L¯∞)
2B¯∞
(w + ∆)2 +
2ζB¯∞ − TN µ¯
B¯∞µ¯
(w + ∆)
− log(C).
Next, we will expand the quadratic term and group by the power in wealth:
=
1
B¯∞
∫ w+∆
dx χ(x)x+
ζ(1− 2L¯∞)
2B¯∞
w2 +
2ζB¯∞ − TN µ¯+ ζ∆µ¯(1− 2L¯∞)
B¯∞µ¯
w
− log(C),
(3.2)
=f¯(w) +
1
B¯∞
∫ w+∆
w
dx χ(x)x+
ζ∆(1− 2L¯∞)
B¯∞
w(3.3)
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where, without loss of generality, the constant term has been absorbed into the con-
stant of integration C. Hence, for any redistribution function χ(w) and WAA param-
eter ζ, there exists a function f(w) such that the agent density decays according to
P (w) ≈ Ce−f(w) + cWΞ(w). We provide the AWM distribution at large wealth in
terms of the EYSM distribution in Equation (3.3) with correction terms.
In Section 2.2.2, we reviewed the results of prior work that showed the existence of
a second-order phase transition in the EYSM. This phase transition in the oligarchical
share of wealth occurred whenever the limit of the redistribution χ∞ is less than
ζ [7, 5, 11]. An analogous result holds for the AWM. We will spend the duration of
this section reviewing the derivation of the oligarchical share of wealth in the AWM.
For ease of notation, we introduce the parameter λ ≥ 0, which is defined implicitly
by
∆ = λµ¯.
In general, a larger λ corresponds to a larger maximum value of debt in the model.
Let A¯(w) be the EYSM Pareto-Lorenz Potential defined in Equation (2.1). Let L¯(w)
be the Pareto-Lorenz potential defined in Equation (2.2) for the EYSM, and let L(w)
be its AWM equivalent. These two integral operators can be shown to be related in
the following way:
L(w) = (1 + λ)L¯(w + ∆)− λ[1− A¯(w + ∆)].
[14] Note that A¯(w+∆) and L¯(w+∆) are two of the Pareto potentials in the EYSM.
Then as w →∞, A¯(w + ∆)→ 0 and L¯(w + ∆)→ L¯∞: the asymptotic limit of L¯(w)
defined in Equation (2.14). Hence,
L∞ = lim
w→∞
{
(1 + λ)L¯(w + ∆)− λ[1− A¯(w + ∆)]
}
= (1 + λ)L¯∞ − λ.(3.4)
By Equation (3.4), the fraction of wealth held by the oligarch in the AWM is
closely related to that which was introduced in the EYSM. Moreover, due to the
inclusion of L¯∞ in Equation (3.4), the AWM exhibits a similar phase transition to
that of the EYSM. Suppose that χ∞ ≥ ζ, as would be the case in a subcritical or
critical economy. By Equations (2.14) and (3.4),
L∞ = (1 + λ)× 1− λ = 1.
This implies that the oligarchical share of wealth is zero. Suppose that χ∞ < ζ, as
would be the case in an EYSM supercritical economy. By Equations (2.14) and (3.4),
L∞ = (1 + λ)
χ∞
ζ
− λ.
Hence, the fraction of wealth held by the oligarch is equal to
c = 1− L∞ = (1 + λ)
(
1− χ∞
ζ
)
.(3.5)
Therefore, the fraction of wealth held by the partial oligarch is magnified by the
amount of negative wealth in a society. These results are summarized in the following
equation:
L∞ =
{
1 χ∞ ≥ ζ
(1 + λ)χ∞ζ − λ χ∞ < ζ
.(3.6)
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Note that if λ = 0, as would be the case for nonnegative wealth, Equation (3.6)
reverts back to the asymptotics of L¯(w) in the EYSM. Hence, this argument truly
does generalize the EYSM with general redistribution to include the possibility of
negative wealth.
4. Inverse problem.
4.1. Redistribution as a function of large-wealth agent density. After
deriving Equation (3.2), we observed that for any redistribution function χ(w) and
WAA parameter ζ, there exists a function f(w) such that agent density decays accord-
ing to P (w) ≈ Ce−f(w) + cWΞ(w) where c depends on the limit of χ(w) relative to ζ.
It is worth noting that the converse of this statement may not be true. In this section,
we will delve into the inverse problem to Section 3. In particular, given that policy-
makers would like the distribution of large wealth to obey P (w) ≈ Ce−f(w)+cWΞ(w),
what redistribution policy should they follow? Is the distribution they have in mind
even possible within the context of the AWM? In this section, we aim to provide a
formal answer to these questions.
Throughout this section, we will assume knowledge of a function f(w)—twice
differentiable on (M,∞) for some M > −∆—such that agent density at large wealth
is of the form P (w) ≈ Ce−f(w) + cWΞ(w). Thus, we allow for the possibility of
oligarchy in our a priori assumption on P (w). However, because we are primarily
concerned with the distribution of large wealth and not that of oligarchs, we will
not delve into the deep and interesting literature on Ξ(w). We refer any readers
interested in the oligarch’s contribution to the distribution of wealth to prior work
on this subject [7, 11]. For now, the constant c = 1 − L∞ can be thought of as a
parameter to be tuned by legislators when drafting policy. Many of the following
derivations will be analogous to those in Section 2. The important distinction is
that in Section 2, we assumed knowledge of χ(w) and an a priori asymptotic form
P (w) ≈ Ce−f(w) + cWΞ(w) for some function f(w) that satisfies Equations (2.11)-
(2.13). In this section, we assume knowledge of a P (w) satisfying Equations (2.11)-
(2.13) and hence the asymptotic form P (w) ≈ Ce−f(w) + cWΞ(w), but make the a
priori assumption that there is a χ(w) that will produce the asymptotic distribution
of P (w).
As in Section 2.1, we set the time-derivative of the EYSM’s Fokker-Planck equa-
tion with general redistribution—Equation (2.6)—equal to zero and integrate once
with respect to wealth to obtain Equation (2.7). Note that Lemma 2.1 is still appli-
cable for asymptotic approximations, as any EYSM agent density function that we
will consider satisfies the conditions stated in Equations (2.11)-(2.13) by assumption.
Then the approximations that were made in Appendix C to derive the asymptotic
form of f¯(w) from the steady-state EYSM Fokker-Planck equation are still valid, and
we arrive at Equation (2.15), as in Section 2.2.2. We then can apply the transforma-
tion discussed in Section 3 to obtain a form for f(w): the negative logarithm of the
AWM agent density function. At this point, we rearrange Equation (3.2) to find that
the redistribution function χ(w) must satisfy
∫ w+∆
dx χ(x)x =B¯∞f¯(w) +
ζ(2L¯∞ − 1)
2
w2 +
2ζB¯∞ − TN µ¯+ ζ∆µ¯(1− 2L¯∞)
µ¯
w
if it exists for a given distribution P (w). Applying the Fundamental Theorem of
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Calculus and dividing by w, we find that χ(w) must have the asymptotic form
χ(w + ∆) =ζ(2L¯∞ − 1) + B¯∞ f¯
′(w)
w
+
2ζB¯∞ − TN µ¯+ ζ∆µ¯(1− 2L¯∞)
µ¯
1
w
(4.1)
We can thus find χ(w) by inputting w −∆ on the right hand side of Equation (4.1).
We now will apply a Maclaurin expansion of χ(w) about ∆.
χ(w) =ζ(2L¯∞ − 1) + B¯∞ f¯
′(w)
w
+
2ζB¯∞ − TN µ¯
µ¯
1
w
+O
(
∆
w2
)
,
where we have used big-O notation to refer to subdominant terms in the Taylor
expansion. We assume that w is very large so that ∆ is small relative to w. Then ∆
is even smaller compared to w2, and we may approximate χ(w) by its leading terms:
χ(w) ≈ζ(2L¯∞ − 1) + B¯∞ f¯
′(w)
w
+
2ζB¯∞ − TN µ¯
µ¯
1
w
.(4.2)
The reader may be concerned that χ(w) is defined in terms of T , which is itself a
functional of χ(w). We note that for all redistribution functions we consider relevant,
the total redistribution will be constant. For this reason, we assume that it is an
arbitrary constant for the purpose of solving Equation (4.2) and assume that its value
can be set once χ(w) and P (w) are known.
Equation (4.2) implies that we can describe asymptotic redistribution as the sum
of a constant and some function of wealth. In particular, we let
χ(w) : ≈ ζ(2L¯∞ − 1) + ι(w),
where ι(w) is defined by
ι(w) : ≈ B¯∞ f¯
′(w)
w
+
2ζB¯∞ − TN µ¯
µ¯
1
w
.
We note that the behavior of ι(w) – as the sole non-constant contribution to redis-
tribution at large wealth – will dictate the large-wealth behavior of redistribution.
At this point, we are free to consider the implications of the derived form of χ(w),
which is in terms of f ′(w). To do this, we introduce some important terminology.
Assume P (w) ≈ Ce−f(w) + cWΞ(w), where f(w) is a differentiable function. We
say that P (w) decays sub-quadratically if f ′(w)  w. Similarly, we say that P (w)
decays quadratically if f ′(w) ≈ aw for some a 6= 0. Finally, we say that P (w) decays
super-quadratically if f ′(w) w.
4.2. Criticality in the Affine Wealth Model with general redistribution.
Prior work on the AWM observed a critical relationship in the case where the redis-
tribution function χ(w) is asymptotically constant, tending towards a limit we shall
call χ∞ [11]. When χ∞ < ζ, agent density was observed to decay like a Gaussian,
and there was a partial oligarchy with share of wealth c = 1− χ∞ζ . By contrast, when
χ > ζ, agent density decayed like a Gaussian with no oligarchy whatsoever (c = 0).
However, when χ∞ = ζ – a state introduced earlier as criticality – agent density
was observed to decay exponentially, with no oligarch. In this subsection, we will
show that the critical exponential decay that was observed in prior work is actually
a special case of a more general family of sub-quadratic decays [11, 6]. We will prove
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that there exists a family of sub-quadratic decays with redistribution χ(w) ≈ ζ and
no oligarchy.
Suppose that f(w) is a twice-differentiable function on (M,∞) for some M > −∆,
that it satisfies Equations (2.11)-(2.13), and that f ′(w)  w, a condition which
corresponds to agent density decaying sub-quadratically. It is clear from Equation
(4.1) that ι(w)→ 0 as w →∞, so that χ(w)→ ζ(2L¯∞−1). However, the construction
of χ(w) is such that all higher-order (quadratic and linear) terms are canceled in the
asymptotic form for f(w). So, ι(w) contributes non-negligibly to large-wealth agent
density. Prior work has dealt only with constant redistribution schemes. Therefore
the critical exponential distribution – the case in which χ(w) = χ = ζ and L¯∞ = 1
– seemed like the unique sub-quadratic decay satisfying these properties [11]. The
above argument extends this idea to a family of sub-quadratic distributions. We have
assumed nothing about the existence or nonexistence of oligarchy in the sub-quadratic
case, but note that if L¯∞ = 1, this argument describes redistribution functions χ(w),
tending toward ζ as w → ∞, that will produce other sub-quadratic decays that are
not exponential.
We have shown that many sub-quadratic decays are possible by allowing non-
constant redistribution, and that to attain such a distribution of large wealth, χ(w)
must tend toward ζ(2L¯∞ − 1) as w → ∞. However, the way that χ(w) approaches
this limit warrants further discussion. Suppose that a government is aiming for a
sub-quadratic distribution of wealth C1e
−g(w) but that the limit of redistribution it
aims for differs by a small margin from ζ(1 − 2L¯∞). In particular, if  ∈ R is some
small, possibly negative constant, suppose that χ(w) → ζ(2L¯∞ − 1) +  as wealth
becomes large. In this case, Equation (2.15) tells us that agent density will behave
like C2e
−f(w) + cWΞ(w), where
f(w) ≈ 1
B∞
∫ w+∆
dx
[
 x+ B¯∞g′(x)
]
(4.3)
and c is implied implicitly by c = 1 − L∞ and Equation (3.6). We have assumed
that g′(w)  w, so Equation (4.3) will at some point be well-approximated by an
order-w2 term. However, there may be a section of the wealth distribution where the
contribution from g(x) competes with  w2 if the value  is sufficiently small.
Importantly, the point at which the linear term in the integrand of Equation (4.3)
dominates the g′(w) term may be near the end of the wealth spectrum, where the
discretization of agent density will make it irrelevant. By continuity, there is a point
w at which g
′(w) = w. At this point, the two terms in the integrand of Equation
(4.3) become comparable, but for wealth much lower than this, P (w) ≈ C1e−g(w).
Similarly, for wealth much greater than w, agent density will decay like a Gaussian,
and the theory of prior work on criticality applies [11, 14]. However, if it is true
that NA(w) < 1, where A(w) is defined to be the AWM equivalent to the Pareto-
Lorenz potential given in Equation (2.1), there will be no economic agents with wealth
greater than w. This argument shows that the discretization of agent density allows
the limit of redistribution to differ from the WAA parameter while still attaining a
sub-quadratic distribution of wealth.
The redistribution function corresponds to the policy choices of a society, and
this analysis shows that those choices are of the utmost importance for economies
near criticality. The redistribution function has been broken up into its constant and
non-constant contributions. In the case of a sub-quadratic decays in agent density,
the non-constant contribution ι(w) tends towards zero as w → ∞. However, the
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argument of this section has shown that the way in which ι(w) tends towards zero
indicates the nature of the sub-quadratic decay which is attained. Hence, when an
economy is near-critical, the qualitative nature of its distribution of large wealth is
extremely sensitive to the trivialities of redistribution policy.
4.3. Asymptotic redistribution functions for common tails. The work
of Section 4.2 implies that it is possible to attain any sub-quadratic tail given some
redistribution function. In the literature on wealth distribution tails, many forms
have been fitted to empirical data. In this section, we will provide the asymptotic
redistribution function necessary to attain common distributions in the study of tails
of wealth distributions. To do this, we first convert a probability density function to
an agent density function by multiplying by N . We then consider the dominant term
or terms in the asymptotic form of f(w) ≈ − log(P ). From this, it is easy to derive
the asymptotic redistribution function from Equation (4.2). We will assume that if P
has a sub-quadratic decay, then L∞ = 1, as is the case of an exponential decay [6, 11].
These results are provided in Table 1.
Table 1
The redistribution functions for six classes of distributions that are commonly
observed within the study of wealth economics. The redistribution function χ(w) is derived
from Equation (4.2). We have used in the case of the Exponential distribution that the D
w
term
must cancel due to Equation (2.15). We also assume for higher-order Gaussian distributions that
m ∈ (1,∞). For ease of notation, we define the constant D implicitly by ι(w) = B∞ f
′(w)
w
+ D
w
. We
also define C to be some normalization constant and forgo the barring of B∞ and µ.
Distribution Agent Density Function Asymptotic f(w) χ(w)
Exponential C exp[−λw] λw ζ
Log-normal C 1
w
exp
[− [ln(w)2−1]2
2σ2
]
1
σ2
log(w)2 ζ + D
w
+ 2B∞
σ2
log(w)
w2
Pareto Cwα+1 (α+ 1) log(w) ζ + D
w
+
(α+1)B∞
w2
Inverse-Gamma Cw−(α+1) exp
[−β
w
]
(α+ 1) log(w) + β
w
ζ + D
w
+
(α+1)B∞−βB∞
w2
Gaussian C exp
[− (w−µ)2
σ2
]
w2
σ2
limw→∞ χ(w) 6= ζ
Higher-Order
Gaussian
C exp
[− (w−µ)2m
σ2m
]
w2m
σ2m
2mB∞
σ2m
w2m−2
The first four rows of Table 1 consist of sub-quadratic decays. Notably, each of
the redistribution functions necessary to attain these wealth distribution tails differ
from one another by solely a sub-dominant term on the order of 1w or
1
w2 . This result
is all the more evident when comparing the Pareto and Inverse-Gamma distributions’
redistribution functions at large wealth. The necessary redistribution functions for
these two different decays vary by a factor of solely −B¯∞βw2 . This result emphasizes the
importance of the results in Section 4.2. The minute details of redistribution policy
have a dynamic effect on the shape of wealth distributions in their tails when near
wealth condensation criticality.
4.4. Application to European Central Bank data. In Section 4.1, we
showed that when an economy is near-critical, the minor details of its redistribution
policy govern its wealth distribution’s tail’s behavior. In this section, we will present
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the fittings of the AWM with flat redistribution to the empirical wealth data provided
by the European Central Bank (ECB) on the distributions of wealth of fourteen
European countries. A Lorenz curve, denoted L(F ) is a parametric plot of L(w)
against F (w) := 1 − A(w). This is a curve in the unit square, parametrized by the
wealth w, that can be shown to be concave up and lie below the diagonal. A point
(f, l) on the Lorenz curve tells us that a fraction l of wealth is held by a fraction f
of economic agents. The farther the Lorenz curve is from the diagonal of the unit
square, the more inequality exists in an economy. Inequality can be quantified using
the Gini coefficient G, which is defined to be two times the area under the Lorenz
curve. A Gini coefficient of 0 would therefore represent a total oligarchy and a Gini
coefficient of 1 would represent a uniform distribution of wealth.
First, we set χ(w) = χ to be a constant function in this section. Thus, our
parameter space is θ = {χ, ζ, λ}. Let L(F ) be the empirical Lorenz curve and Lθ(F )
is the theoretical Lorenz curve for the theoretical (model) Lorenz curve of the agent
density function given by the AWM with parameters θ := {χ, ζ, λ} [14]. We define
the discrepancy by
J(θ) :=
∫ 1
0
dF |L(F )− Lθ(F )|.(4.4)
Thus, J(θ) is the L1 norm of the difference between the empirical Lorenz curve and
that of the AWM with parameter choices θ. The fittings to ECB data were performed
by minimizing J(θ) over θ. There are no guarantees for the concavity of J(θ), so we
employed a global numerical search for the optimal parameters. The optimal values
for χ, ζ, and λ are given in Table 2. We let Gfit refer to the Gini coefficient of the
AWM-fitted Lorenz curve.
Table 2
Optimal redistribution, WAA, and negative wealth parameters for the AWM when
fitted to fourteen ECB countries’ empirical wealth data. The values χopt, ζopt, and λopt
are defined to be the optimal parameters for the AWM fitting to a given country’s ECB wealth data.
Gfit is the Gini coefficient of the corresponding wealth distribution, as obtained by the Affine Wealth
Model [14].
Country χopt ζopt λopt Gfit
Austria 0.156 0.182 0.185 0.763
Belgium 1.406 1.514 0.577 0.589
Cyprus 0.164 0.190 0.096 0.690
Germany 0.162 0.184 0.199 0.759
Spain 1.568 1.728 0.502 0.568
Finland 0.972 1.000 0.639 0.665
France 0.556 0.608 0.286 0.673
Greece 1.944 2.000 0.650 0.553
Italy 1.194 1.300 0.502 0.601
Lithuania 0.896 1.066 0.425 0.658
Malta 1.154 1.348 0.377 0.583
Netherlands 1.676 1.516 0.992 0.647
Portugal 0.564 0.678 0.309 0.672
Slovenia 1.978 1.998 0.618 0.529
It is notable that our data fittings of the AWM found all fourteen European
countries to be near-critical (Fig 1). The theoretical work in Section 4.2 showed
that when an economy is near-critical, the qualitative nature of the distribution of
large wealth depends sensitively on redistribution policy. We have shown that the
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exact nature of the distribution of large wealth in a near-critical economy depends
sensitively on the minute details of public policy, which are modeled by ι(w). Thus,
it is possible that each of these countries has a qualitatively different sub-quadratic
decay in agent density at large wealth.
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Fig. 1. Plots of optimal redistribution parameters (χopt) of against optimal WAA
parameters (ζopt) for fourteen ECB countries.
For some of the results of our fittings, the error was so small that the Lorenz curve
given by our model was difficult to discriminate from that of the empirical data. For
this reason, we will consider the performance of our model in terms of local error as
well. We define the local error as the length of a line segment connecting the empirical
data point (fj , lj) to the model Lorenz curve, constructed so as to be perpendicular
to the latter. This section’s models assumed that redistribution was constant in the
AWM. Therefore, if the limit of redistribution was not exactly equal to the WAA
parameter, the distribution of large wealth was assumed to be Gaussian. Despite
the small point-wise error of these fittings, it is notable that for many countries, the
vast majority of point-wise error in the fittings occurs in the tail. Four excellent
examples of this relatively large error in the tail are provided in Fig 2. We conjecture
that the point-wise error in the tail of the distribution is explained by the state of
near-criticality and the assumption of a Gaussian distribution at large wealth. Our
work in Section 4.2 shows that because these countries are near-critical, there could
be a non-exponential, sub-quadratic decay which describes the tail of these countries
distributions better than a Gaussian.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2. Optimal fits of the AWM to ECB data for four countries. For each country, we
determined the parameter (χ, ζ, λ) that minimizes the L1-norm of the difference between empirical
and model Lorenz curves. Pointwise error is plotted within each figure. The fraction of oligarchical
wealth can be estimated by Equation (3.6). Notably, the local error is large in the tail, suggesting
the presence of a non-exponential sub-quadratic decay. (a): Belgium. (b): Luxembourg. (c): Malta.
(d): Portugal.
5. Conclusion. This brings us to the overall conclusion of this work: that there
is no universal form for most real-world economies’ wealth distribution tails. We have
shown that the nature of the asymptotic solution to the Fokker-Planck equation gov-
erning the AWM sensitively depends on one’s choice in redistribution policy when an
economy is near-critical (Section 4.2). When the AWM was fit to the wealth data of
fourteen European Union countries, we found that each one was near-critical (Table
2). We conclude that the popular question of whether wealth decays like a Pareto
distribution or an exponential distribution cannot be answered without first consid-
ering the policies of the country from which data was collected. This implies that
there is no universal form for wealth distributions, at least at large wealth. Because
of the exhibited sensitivity that a distribution of wealth has to the particularities of
redistribution policy, we suggest a reframing of how the distribution of large wealth is
studied. In particular, rather than fitting distributions to wealth data and observing
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how accurate those fittings may be, we suggest an emphasis on studying redistribu-
tion policy and its effects on the entire wealth distribution. This approach would
more readily capture the integrodifferential nature of the equations governing wealth
distributions [14]. The bulk of econophysics research, in tandem with the work de-
scribed in our research, shows that this is a more scientific and well-posed approach
to understanding a distribution of wealth.
In this work, we have extended the Extended Yard Sale and Affine Wealth Mod-
els by generalizing redistribution to be a nearly arbitrary function of wealth [5, 14].
We showed that every sub-quadratic decay satisfying the assumptions of this work is
possible by means of a progressive redistribution function with a wealth limit within
a neighborhood of the WAA parameter. This extends the notion of criticality—the
phenomenon of the presence of oligarchy disappearing when constant redistribution
is exactly equal to the WAA parameter—to include a plethora of sub-quadratic de-
cays other than the exponential considered by prior work [5, 14]. These include the
lognormal and Pareto distributions. We note that the way that the redistribution
function tends towards its asymptote governs the distribution of wealth. This implies
that near-critical systems are extremely sensitive to the minutiae of redistribution
policy. Moreover, this sensitive dependence of the nature of wealth distributions im-
plies that the redistribution policy decisions of a society are more indicative of the
distribution of large wealth than any underlying economic forces when that society is
near criticality.
The fact that the asymptotic redistribution rate need not be exactly equal to the
WAA parameter is of the utmost importance to policy decisions in global economics.
We fit the AWM to empirical wealth data from fourteen European economies and
found that all lie either just above or below criticality (Fig 1). Our work implies
that the conversation about how large wealth is distributed may be ill-posed, as the
distribution will sensitively on the policy decision specific to those countries. This
implies that a universal distribution of wealth like that which has been sought for from
Pareto to Piketty seeks is likely a chimera. We emphasize that to understand a near-
critical wealth distribution, one must thoroughly analyze large wealth redistribution
policies that vary across societies.
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Appendix A. Class of functions satisfying our assumptions.
In this section, we prove that given a function f(w) satisfying some loose condi-
tions, the assumptions of this work will hold.
Proposition A.1. If f(w) ≈ wp logq(w) where either p > 0, q ∈ R or p = 0, q >
1, Equations (2.11)-(2.13) are satisfied.
Proof. Case 1: Assume that p > 0 and q ∈ R.
1. By assumption, f ′(w) ≈ ap wp−1 logq(w), which is positive for all large
wealth. Therefore, Equation (2.11) holds.
2. Consider the following limit:
lim
w→∞
f ′′(w)
[f ′(w)]2
=
1
a
lim
w→∞
p(p− 1) log2(w) + (2p− 1)q log(w) + q(q − 1))
wp logq(w)[p log(w) + q]2
=
p− 1
ap
lim
w→∞
1
logq(w)wp
= 0.
Therefore, Equation (2.12) holds.
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3. Consider the following limit:
lim
w→∞
w2
[f ′(w)]2
e−f(w) = lim
w→∞
log2−2q(w)e−aw
p logq(w)
a2w2(p−2)(p log(w) + q)2
=
1
a2p2
lim
w→∞
e−aw
p logq(w)
w2(p−2) log2q(w)
=
1
a2p2
lim
w→∞
w−aw
p logq−1(w)
w2(p−2) log2q(w)
= 0.
Therefore, Equation (2.13) holds
Case 2: Assume that p = 0 and q > 1. Then
1. By assumption, f ′(w) ≈ q logq−1(w)w , which is positive for all large wealth.
Thus, Equation (2.11) holds.
2. Consider the following limit:
lim
w→∞
f ′′(w)
[f ′(w)]2
= lim
w→∞
[
q − 1
q logq(w)
− 1
logq−1(w)
]
= 0.
Thus, Equation (2.12) holds.
3. Consider the following limit:
lim
w→∞
w2
[f ′(w)]2
e−f(w) = lim
w→∞
w4
q2 log2(q−1)
exp[− logq(w)]
= lim
w→∞
w4−log
q−1(w)
q2 log2(q−1)(w)
= 0.
Thus, Equation (2.13) holds.
Therefore, our assumptions are satisfied by the following class of functions:
wp logq(w), where either p > 0 and q ∈ R, or p = 0 and q > 1.
Appendix B. Further notes on the consequences of our asymptotic
assumptions.
In this section, we derive some facts which are used throughout this work.
Lemmas B.2-B.4 are consequences of our assumptions: Equations (2.11)-(2.13). We
assume that wealth is sufficiently large that these assumptions are valid.
Lemma B.1. If limw→∞ f(w) =∞ and g′(w) f ′(w), then g(w) f(w).
Proof. Because g′(w)  f ′(w) for all positive M , however large, there exists an
nM > 0, where w > nM implies that g
′(w) > Mf ′(w). This implies that
g(w) = g(nM ) +
∫ w
nM
dx g′(x)
g(w) > g(nM ) +M
∫ w
nM
dx f ′(x)
g(w) > [g(nM )−Mf(nM )] +Mf(w)
g(w)
f(w)
>
g(nM )
f(w)
−M f(nM )
f(w)
+M.
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Note that since we assume that nM is a constant and that f(w) is an infinite function,
for w large, f(nM )f(w) ≈ g(nM )f(w) ≈ 0. Then at large wealth, we have that there exists an
n′M > 0 such that for all w > n
′
M , it is true that g(w) > Mf(w). Thus, g(w) f(w).
Lemma B.2. Under the assumptions listed in Equations (2.11)-(2.13), it can be
proven that exp[f(w)] w2f ′(w) .
Proof. By Equation (2.13), ef(w)  w2[f ′(w)]2 . Since w
2
[f ′(w)]2  wf ′(w) , we have
through transitivity that ef(w)  wf ′(w) . Thus,
ef(w)  w
f ′(w)
f ′(w)ef(w)  w.
Note that because f ′(w)ef(w)  w, both are necessarily infinite functions of wealth.
Therefore, the assumptions of Lemma B.1 are satisfied and by integrating, we see that
ef(w)  w2.(B.1)
Taking the geometric mean of Equation (2.13) and Equation (B.1), we arrive at our
result.
ef(w) =
√
e2f(w) 
√
w2
w2
[f ′(w)]2
=
w2
f ′(w)
.
Lemma B.3. Under the assumptions listed in Equations (2.11)-(2.13),
exp[f(w)] w.
Proof. By Equation (B.1) in our proof of Lemma B.2, exp[f(w)] w2  w.
Lemma B.4. Under the assumptions listed in Equations (2.11)-(2.13), if ′(w)
1
w .
Proof. By Lemma B.3,
exp[f(w)] w
f(w) log(w).
In particular,
0 = lim
w→∞
log(w)
f(w)
= lim
w→∞
1
w
f ′(w)
,
where we have applied L’Hopital’s Rule to arrive at our conclusion.
Appendix C. Reduction of the steady-state Extended Yard Sale Model
Fokker-Planck equation.
In this appendix, we will derive Equation (2.15) using the assumptions provided
in Equations (2.11)-(2.13). First, let us rearrange the steady-state EYSM Fokker-
Planck equation with general redistribution–Equation (2.7)–
d
dw
[logP ] =
T
N − χ(w)w − ζ
[
2N
W
(
B − w22 A
)
+ (1− 2L)w]− wAP
B + w
2
2 A
.(C.1)
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By Lemma 2.1, we can approximate the Pareto-Lorenz potentials on (M,∞) by the
following functional forms:
A(w) =
1
N
∫ ∞
w
dx P (x) ≈ 1
N
1
f ′(w)
P (w)(C.2)
L(w) = L∞ − 1
W
∫ ∞
w
dx xP (x) ≈ L∞ − 1
W
w
f ′(w)
P (w)(C.3)
B(w) = B∞ − 1
N
∫ ∞
w
dx
x2
2
P (x) ≈ B∞ − 1
2N
w2
f ′(w)
P (w).(C.4)
The process by which Equation (C.1) reduces to Equation (2.15) is rather arduous and
requires the application of the assumptions listed in Equations (2.11)-(2.13) as well
as their consequences, which are provided in Section B. For this reason, we will prove
three lemmas (Lemmas C.1-C.3). Then, in Proposition C.4, we will show that these
three lemmas can be used to derive Equation (2.15) as a large-wealth approximation
of P (w).
Lemma C.1. At large wealth,
B ± w
2
2
A ≈ B∞.
Proof. Consider this quantity in the context of our asymptotic approximations of
the Pareto-Lorenz Potentials.
B ± w
2
2
A ≈ B∞ − 1
2N
w2
f ′(w)
P (w)± 1
2N
w2
f ′(w)
P (w)
= B∞ +
C(−1± 1)
2N
w2
f ′(w)
e−f(w)
=
[
B∞ef(w) +
C(−1± 1)
2N
w2
f ′(w)
]
e−f(w)
≈ B∞,
where we have used that ef(w)  w2f ′(w) , which is true by Lemma B.2
Lemma C.2. At large wealth, for any constant c,
wAP  c.
Proof. We will prove the equivalent condition that c+wAP ≈ c at large wealth.
c+ wAP = c+
C
N
we−f(w)
∫ w
0
dx P (x) =
[
cef(w) +
C
N
wA(w)
]
e−f(w)
Recall that A(w) is bounded by [0, 1] for all w and our assumptions implied that
ef(w)  w, which was proven in Lemma B.3. Then
c ≤
[
cef(w) +
C
N
wA(w)
]
e−f(w) ≤
[
cef(w) +
C
N
w
]
e−f(w) ≈ c.
Therefore, c+ wAP ≈ c.
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Lemma C.3. At large wealth,
ζ
[
2N
W
(
B − w
2
2
A
)
+ (1− 2L)w
]
≈ ζ
[
2NB∞
W
+ (1− 2L∞)w
]
.
Proof. Consider this quantity in the context of our asymptotic approximations of
the Pareto-Lorenz potentials, stated in Equations (C.2)-(C.4). Applying Lemma C.1,
ζ
[
2N
W
(
B − w
2
2
A
)
+ (1− 2L)w
]
≈ζ
[
2NB∞
W
+ w(1− 2L∞) + 2C
W
w2
f ′(w)
e−f(w)
]
≈ζ
[
2NB∞
W
+ (1− 2L∞)w
]
,
where we have used that ef(w)  w2f ′(w) , which was proven in Lemma B.2.
We are now equipped to use Lemmas C.1-C.3 to prove that f(w) = − log[P (w)]
reduces to the functional form provided in Equation (2.15).
Proposition C.4. At large wealth,
f(w) ≈ 1
B∞
∫ w
dx χ(x)x+
ζ(1− 2L∞)
2B∞
w2 +
2ζB∞N2 − TW
B∞NW
w.
Proof. By Lemmas C.1-C.3
d
dw
[log(P )] =
T
N − χ(w)w − ζ
[
2N
W
(
B − w22 A
)
+ (1− 2L)w]− wAP
B + w
2
2 A
(C.5)
≈
T
N − χ(w)w − ζ
[
2NB∞
W + (1− 2L∞)w
]
B∞
=
1
B∞
(
T
N
− χ(w)w
)
− ζ
[
2N
W
+
1
B∞
(1− 2L∞)w
]
(C.6)
Note that
d
dw
(
logP
)
=
d
dw
[−f(w)] = −f ′(w).
Therefore, we find that at the tail of the distribution satisfies
−f ′(w) ≈ − 1
B∞
χ(w)w − ζ(1− 2L∞)
B∞
w +
TW − 2ζB∞N2
B∞NW
f ′(w) ≈ 1
B∞
χ(w)w +
ζ(1− 2L∞)
B∞
w +
2ζB∞N2 − TW
B∞NW
f(w) ≈ 1
B∞
∫ w
dx χ(x)x+
ζ(1− 2L∞)
2B∞
w2 +
2ζB∞N2 − TW
B∞NW
w,
where we have disregarded a subdominant constant of integration. Thus, we have
arrived at our result.
